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Abstract  
This paper examines the writings of one of the most influential political philosophers of our time Hannah 
Arendt. It focuses especially on her views regarding “The Crisis in Education”, where she asserts that 
“education is the point at which we decide whether we love the world enough to assume responsibility 
for it and by the same token save it from that ruin which, except for renewal, except for the coming of the 
new and young, would be inevitable. Hannah Arendt’s work points towards how we can fall short in our 
responsibility for, and love of, the world, and for that, education can become complicit in the erosion of a 
vibrant and robust public realm, the realm of politics. So education should aim at preparing the child for 
this challenge. In this regard, Arendt’s work takes on a prophetic character, because it denounces a 
process of alienation in respect to a world that is still ongoing in the field of education. 
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1. Introduction 
This review, discusses Hannah Arendt’s ideas about the crisis in education in the contemporary world 
especially in America. Her hypothesis is that the crisis in education is also related to the introduction of 
educational approaches of psycho-pedagogical nature, which instead of contributing to educate the youth 
so that they assume responsibility for the world and take political action, are keeping them in an infantile 
condition until they reach adulthood, thus, creating, new political issues Arendt, tells us that crisis in 
education are the products of modern phenomena and invites us to behold the crisis as a privileged 
moment to exercise critical thinking. In Arendt’s opinion, the crisis must be understood as a crucial 
opportunity to make critical reflections on the educational process itself.  
We shall argue that Hannah Arendt provides an illuminating perspective on the “crisis” of education. 
Because her work does not cohere with either contemporary liberal or contemporary conservative 
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criticisms or justifications of higher education, or with either moral or vocational promises about its merit, 
Arendt’s understanding of education appears less as a competing approach than as simply an eclipsed 
perspective. By focusing on the meanings and values of the public world of politics, we shall submit that 
her reflections on education illuminate politics in contemporary epoch. Now let us first of all examine the 
meaning and the concept of education which will provide the basis of our analysis of Arendt’s critique. 
 
2. Etymological Meaning of Education 
In English, the term “Education” has been derived from two Latin words Educare (Educere) and 
Educatum. “Educare” means to train or mould. It again means to bring up or to lead out or to draw out, 
propulsion from inward to outward. The term “Educatum” denotes the act of teaching. It throws light on 
the principles and practice of teaching. The term Educare or Educere mainly indicates development of 
the latent faculties of the child. But the child does not know these possibilities. It is the educator or the 
teacher who can know these and take appropriate methods to develop those powers.  
If we go into certain definitions of education of great educators of the East and the West, we may have a 
clearer picture of the nature and meaning of the term education. However, that would be outside the 
scope of this article. Thus, let us look for a working concept.  
2.1 A Working Concept 
There are many concepts and definitions of education by great educators of the East and West from Plato 
Rabindranath Tagore through Jean-Jacque Rousseau to John Dewey. Putting them together, we can 
deduce and conclude that education is a life that is devoted to intellectual excellence, promotes a genuine 
love for knowledge and ideas and not just simply what is practical and useful. It is a systematic process 
through which a child acquires knowledge, experience, skill and sound attitude. It makes an individual 
civilized, refined, cultured and educated. “For a civilized and socialized society, education is the only 
means. Its goal is to make an individual perfect. Every society gives importance to education because it is 
a panacea for all evils. It is the key to solve the various problems of life” (Note 1). 
What a surprise, therefore, to see that Hannah Arendt writes that school and ingenuity are not and have 
never been the proper places for the display of human excellence. Arendt writes that excellence is found 
only in the public realm, that space to which “excellence has always been assigned”. This paper is 
devoted to critical examination this idea of Hannah Arendt to find out if it has actually relevance to 
politics in our present society. What then does she mean by Public Realm? 
 
3. The Public Realm/Private Realm 
The public is the political and Arendt refers to it as “the locus in which mutual and genuine relationships 
between peers occur, corresponding to the polis life and citizenship characterized by freedom and 
individuality” (Note 2), This is “the place everybody needs the other in order to distinguish him or 
herself and show in deed and word that he or she is unique (thereby becoming immortal) where a remedy 
for futility of action and speech is, offered” (Note 3). Arendt explains that a public realm “cannot be 
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erected for one generation and planned for the living only; it must transcend the life span of mortal men” 
(Note 4). She contrasts the public with the private sphere, corresponding to the household, governed with 
necessity and driven by wants and needs and generally by life itself (Note 5). Hence, “the private is the 
centre of vital production including not only economic concerns but also bodily function and species 
reproduction” (Note 6). Under this natural community, “the labour of man to provide nourishment and 
the labour of the woman in giving birth” are subject to and born of the same necessity and urgency of 
life” (Note 7). 
Arendt argues “that in ancient times, the private sphere facilitated the hide away of these labourers and 
their laborious-devoted-to-bodily-functions lives (especially women and slaves) and their segregation 
from the community” (Note 8). A man who lived only a private life, who like the slave was not permitted 
to enter the public realm, or like the barbarian had chosen not to establish such a realm, was not fully 
human. 
We are referring here to a kind of environment, or as Arendt puts it, the world itself, in so far as it is 
common to all of us and distinguished from our privately owned place in it (Note 9). The concern of 
Arendt is that this sharp distinction that existed between Private and public has been distorted by 
modernity and it impossible to provide the proper way to train the children for politics. She bitterly 
remarks that “with ideological or entertainment intrusions, children are forced to expose themselves in a 
public light in a stage of incompleteness, thus potentially retarding their growth and ability to eventually 
form independent, critical judgments” (Note 10). In other words, the more completely modern society 
discards the distinction between what is private and what is pubic, between what can thrive only in 
concealment and what needs to be shown to all in the full light of the public world, the more, it introduces 
between the private and the public a social sphere in which the private is made public and vice versa, the 
harder it makes things for its children, who by nature require the security of concealment in order to 
mature undisturbed” (Note 11). 
Educational achievements, for example learnedness and scholarship, are important for students, but have 
nothing to do with excellence. But what then does Arendt mean by human excellence? And why does it 
require a public realm? More to the point of modern debates, why is education not the proper locus of 
excellence? 
Education is one of the elementary and necessary human activities. As noted before now, the word 
education comes from the Latin verbs educare (to mold) and educere (to lead out). To teach and educate 
is to take a human being in the process of becoming and lead him or her out of the confines of the home 
into the world, into his or her community. Formal education, Arendt argues in The Crisis in Education, is 
the time when schools and teachers assume the responsibility for what we generally call the free 
development of characteristic qualities and talents. This is the stage in the educational development of 
the student in which he or she is not only introduced to the world, but when he or she becomes freely and 
spontaneously acquainted with those qualities that make one unique and further refined as a person. 
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It is also in school that we learn what human excellence is and the conditions in which human excellence 
is properly displayed. Human excellence, Arendt argues, is what the ancient Greeks called arête and the 
Romans virtus. The concepts of arete and virtus were always used by the ancients to denote the good and 
distinctive qualities embodied by those who performed in public. Drawing upon these concepts, Arendt 
argues that human excellence is a public act that manifests what she calls “inspiring principles”, e.g., 
prudence, justice, and courage, qualities of conduct that allow one to excel and distinguish oneself from 
all others. Arendt understands school in this manner. 
 
4. Public Realm and Realm of School  
Unlike the realm of the school, where one is expected only to learn and develop the characteristics used to 
make the principles of prudence, justice and courage manifest, the public realm demands that one’s act 
embodies excellence. It is our capacities for speech and action that allows for this display of excellence to 
be distinctively human. Arendt argues that only “in acting and speaking, that men show who they are, 
reveal actively their unique personal identity and thus make their appearance in the human world”. In 
contrast to education, which is concerned with the development of talents and virtues of the developing 
human being, in the political realm, these talents and virtues are fully developed and displayed. 
Schools for Arendt are neither public nor private but “the institutions that we interpose between the 
private domain of home and the world in order to make the transition from the family to the world”. 
Schools are hidden from the world, as are the activities through which the student first displays his or her 
qualities and talents. Schools offer the student “the security of concealment in order to mature 
undisturbed”. But in order to achieve excellence, action needs an audience, a stage, a public realm where 
these characteristics can be properly manifested and properly received. Activities completed in school 
hide these characteristics and nurture the creative process, in contrast to those performed public, which 
always display the virtuosity, the excellence inherent in action. 
 
5. Public Realm: The Space of Equality 
The public realm is also the space of equality, which is alien to schools. In schools, the teacher is the 
authoritative figure, the one who knows the world, and in order to teach it, deference to authority is 
required. Arendt argues that this responsibility of authority is given to the educator because the educator 
not only knows the world but also belongs and acts in it. In the school, the educator acts as a 
representative of that world by “pointing out the details and saying to the child: this is our world”. Once 
the student knows the world and assumes responsibility for it, he or she can go into the world and act 
virtuously, display human excellence and start something new, which could potentially change it. This is 
why Arendt argues that school is not the “proper place” to display excellence, to act, and create 
something new. This is because, ability to be excellent to act, and to start something new demands 
responsibility for the world. In education, this responsibility takes the form of authority, which is why it 
is given to the educator, and not to the student. 
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This does not mean, however, that Arendt is against changing the world; she is against changing it by 
disturbing the activity of education. Change, the new, is a phenomenon of the political realm, an activity 
performed among equal and fully-grown human beings. For Arendt, the “conservative function” that 
preserves traditions and the status quo in education comes to an end in the political realm. This 
conservative attitude in politics, she says, can only lead to destruction. As she explains: “because the 
world is made by mortals it wears out; and because it continuously changes its inhabitants it runs the risk 
of becoming as mortal as they. To preserve the world from the mortality of its creators and inhabitants it 
must be constantly set right anew”. Arendt maintains that to act and to change the world is expected of 
those who get educated and enter the community of adults and the political world. 
 
6. Love for the World—Amor Mundi 
School for Arendt is where we learn and decide whether we love the world enough to assume 
responsibility for it and renew it or watch it fall as a victim of our very own condition of mortality. In 
order to change the world, one has to love and understand it. For Arendt, one has to learn to love the 
world, whether one wishes to propagate and preserve it or to set it entirely anew; love of the world for her 
is what constitutes the world because it “fits me into it”, it allows one to “under-stand”, to grasp while 
being in the midst of things.  
The world has to be constantly renewed but this can only happen once we leave the concealment of the 
classroom and acquire the courage to enter the political realm. “This is the stage in the educational 
development of the student in which he or she is not only introduced to the world, but when he or she 
becomes freely and spontaneously acquainted with it” (Note 12).  
So education is the point at which we decide whether we love the world enough to assume responsibility 
for it and by the same token save it from that ruin which, except for renewal, except for the coming of the 
new and young, would be inevitable. Moreover, education, too, is where we decide whether we love our 
children enough not to expel them from our world and leave them to their own devices, nor to strike from 
their hands their chance of undertaking something new, something unforeseen by us, but to prepare them 
in advance for the task of renewing a common world. At this juncture, let us examine the human 
conditional of Natality. 
 
7. The Human Condition of Natality 
The most distinctive aspect of Arendt’s philosophy of education and politics is her concept of natality. 
Remarking on the importance of natality to Arendt’s thought, Patricia Bowen says, I quote it verbatim:  
“What frequently has been neglected by her interpreters is Arendt’s sustained focus on the capacity for 
beginning in fact, in thought, and in action which the miracle of human birth announces. Arendt’s 
special term for the profound dimensions of this experience is natality. When accompanied by the 
attitude amor mundi, love for the world, the category of natality provides Arendt’s multifaceted works 
with a unity and structure by which to elucidate her thought. With Hannah Arendt, the experience of 
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natality is elevated to a philosophic thematic; it is the inspiration and meaning governing her 
philosophic and political analyses” (Note 13). 
She claims that “education belongs among the most elementary and necessary activities of human society, 
which never remains as it is but continuously renews itself through birth, through the arrival of new 
human beings” (Note 14).  
Natality calls our attention to the unusual fact that Arendt approaches the education issue by referring it 
to the human condition of natality: Natality is the essence of education, the fact that we have all come into 
the world by being born. In The Human Condition, her most important theoretical work, the author 
asserts that each human birth represents a new beginning. Being born does not mean to merely appear 
into the world, but it represents a new beginning in the world. Natality cannot be confused, therefore, 
with the mere event of being born, but it constitutes the beginning, the new for the human being.  
It is the human condition of natality that assures that one has the possibility to act as an agent in the world, 
initiating new unpredictable relationships. Natality is the main category in political thinking because it is 
the ontological source of action and, therefore, of freedom and of newness, which are intrinsic to the 
origin of men on Earth.  
According to Arendt, “if a child weren’t a newcomer to this world, but only an unfinished live creature, 
education would be merely a life duty and it wouldn’t have to be consisted of nothing that goes beyond 
the concern with life preservation and training and the practice of living that all animals take on in 
relation to their children” (Note 15).  
The human relationship with the world, mediated by education, is also a privileged relationship in the 
sense that it is never given beforehand, but it has to be entangled over again at each new birth, when 
comes to the world an entirely new being that is distinct from the other beings. Therefore, education can 
never be understood as something given, done and finished, but it has to be continually rethought due to 
the changes in the world, in which new human beings come to life.  
Then, although Arendt’s concept of natality maintains connection with the fact of generating mere life (in 
Greek, zoe, the common condition of all life), the really important aspect to be emphasized is the 
relationship between human life and world. In a sense, plants and animals are also “sprung” in a 
determined habitat, but one cannot say they come into the world.  
For Arendt, the world is a peculiar creation of humans, comprised of a set of durable artefacts and 
institutions, which are meant for allowing men to be continually connected to one another and letting 
them be disconnected at the same time. The world is not mistaken for the ground where they move or for 
the nature from which the material to produce their artefacts are extracted, but it has relation to the 
multiple artificial, institutional and cultural bounds that humans interpose one another, themselves and 
their own nature. According do Arendt’s ideas the world also refers to those subjects that are between 
men, that is, those subjects that are of their interest when they get into political affiliation with one 
another. In this more restricted sense, the world also determines the set of institutions and laws that are 
common and appear to all. It concerns that institutional place that must survive to the natural life and 
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death cycle of generations in order to secure some stability to a life that is under constant change, in a 
cycle without beginning or end, in which consecutive living and dying are embodied. Arendt affirms, as 
we have seen before, that “the essence of education is natality, the fact that human beings are born into 
the world” (Note 16). Therefore, it is through education that children begin to live in a world that is 
already old and that still remains unknown to the newcomers. The child is a stranger to us and to the 
world; it comes into the world and to us suddenly and only gradually becomes someone recognizable, 
that is, he or she becomes one of us. Education plays an important role in this change process of the 
child’s radical alterity into something recognizable. As Larrosa declares, “education is the way people, 
institutions and societies receive or respond to the arrival of those who are born” (Note 17).  
However, this act of hosting or receiving the new in an already old world cannot come about without 
tension. At the same time that child and birth represent the safeguarding of world renewal, the world 
itself also needs to be put in safety against the child and youth. For that reason, Arendt argues that 
education is always unquestionably a field of tension, a critical domain in crisis. From this important 
thesis, education can be understood as a field of permanent tension between the new and established, that 
is, between the new beings and a world that is already firmly settled and has a long cultural tradition.  
Understanding education as a field of indissoluble tension, Arendt affirms that “where the line between 
childhood and adulthood falls in each instance cannot be determined by a general rule” (Note 18). After 
all, as education is the only way we have to receive the children that are born and come into the world, the 
conflict and crisis are permanently established in this field, since at each birth a new tension emerges 
between the new and the cultural tradition, displayed in the conversion of that unknown being into “our” 
logic way to see and relate to the world. 
This entails that children-as-students are newcomers who are not born into the world as finished products 
that merely need to be sorted out in a Platonic version of testing and categorizing (as mentioned above) 
but are, rather, in a state of becoming. As the subject of education, the child has a double aspect: he is in 
a state of becoming, like all animals, but is just as much “new in a world that is strange to him” (Note 19) 
(Arendt, 1960). She is not merely “…a new human being … [but she] … is becoming a human being” 
(Note 20) (Arendt, 1960). What Arendt means is that the child is born into the world and must be trained 
in those skills that are conducive to her survival like any other animal or organic being. But unlike other 
species, the child is born into a world that was there before her and will continue long after her death. It is 
that world in which she will spend her life engaged in activities that have less to do with survival than 
with the sort of working and acting that is, essentially, useless for sustenance and survival. Although 
useless, that sort of working and acting contributes to the world in such a way that makes the struggles 
and joys of carrying on in the world worthwhile at all.  
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8. Conclusions/Recommendations 
In discussions about democratic education and in short education in general, there is a strong tendency to 
see the role of education as that of the preparation of children and young people for their future 
participation in democratic life. A major problem with this view is that it relies on the idea that the 
guarantee for democracy lies in the existence of a properly educated citizenry so that once all citizens 
have received their education, democracy will simply follow. In this article we have presented a critical 
analysis the work of Hannah Arendt, with a specific focus on her ideas about the relationship between 
education and politics and her views on the role of understanding in politics. Arendt’s writings on the 
relationship between education and politics maintain that the child is not yet ready for political life, so 
education has to be separated from politics and seen as a preparation for future participation in political 
life. Her writings articulate what it means to exist politically. That is, to exist together in plurality. It also, 
highlights that political existence is neither based on, nor can be guaranteed by, moral qualities such as 
tolerance and respect. I submit that education should not be seen as the preparation of citizens for their 
future participation in political life. Rather, it should focus on creating opportunities for political 
existence inside and outside schools. Instead of thinking of democratic education as learning for political 
existence, it is argued that the focus of our educational endeavours should be on how we can learn from 
political existence. Hence while education is fundamental for founding a vibrant polis, it cannot be 
defined by and thereby reduced to this function. Rather, our education can provide us with access to the 
past, to tradition, to our roots, to stories, that will enable us contribute to the well being of our societies.  
However, the lesson that Arendt’s concept of proper education has to teach us is that we cannot resolve a 
political problem without first of all understanding the meaning of the political. This is something we 
cannot learn in school, but something we must discover in the vibrant and robust public realm.  
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